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Abstract
The global banking system can be shown to be a Complex Adaptive System that exhibits phase
transitions from time to time. These phase transitions can result in significant financial losses to the
community that we estimate to be much more significant than losses occurring during “business as
usual” periods. In this paper, we argue that the significant losses arising from phase transitions in the
banking system requires a very different approach to regulation than the current Basel regime, and
that there is a need to transition the Basel regime from a Federation of Systems to a System of
Systems. We demonstrate that the World Health Organisation’s recent management system for
pandemics is ideally suited for management of the global banking system and would have greater
potential to control the phase transition losses than the current Basel system.
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1. Introduction
Kaufman (1994) argued that the consequences for the community from contagion in the US banking
system justified regulation different to that for the non-financial system. In support of specialist
regulation for the banking system, Kaufman argued that
the evidence also suggests that, compared to nonbanks, bank failure contagion appears faster,
is more likely to spread to a larger proportion of the industry, is likely to lead to a larger
percentage of failures, although runs do not appear to drive solvent banks into insolvency, and
is more likely to spill over to other sectors (1994).
Almost 20 years later, Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015) similarly concluded in relation to the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) that “it seems that the GFC was mainly spread across regions through
domestic/regional financial sectors to other domestic, non-financial sectors”, indicating that banking
*Correspondence to: John Evans, Centre for Analysis of Complex Financial Systems, PO Box 363, Summer Hill
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crises have a greater effect than just within the banking system. Regulation of the banking systems
should then recognise the economy wide contagion effects (Kaufman 1996). The current type of
banking regulation involving capital requirements for individual banks, and usually some form of
insurance for depositors has been criticised for some time as being ineffective, or at least inefficient.
Boyer & Kempf (2017) recognised an inefficient aspect of this current regulatory structure as being that
it is common to consider that international financial integration weakens the efficiency of
banking regulation as national regulatory authorities are involved in a race to the bottom,
leading them to relax their requirements compared to those which would be set if their
economy were closed…. what is involved is not so much a weakening of regulatory standards
as the inability to efficiently regulate the risk-taking by banks when they are freely able to
direct their investment flows worldwide.
In this paper, we will demonstrate that the banking system is a Complex Adaptive System (CAS),
globally integrated, and then suggest the appropriate regulation given that state. We will argue that
systemic risk, which we define as the risk that a crisis occurs in sufficient banks that the provision of
credit to the wider domestic and international community is materially affected, is a critical risk that
needs to be identified and managed in the banking system. We will suggest a regulatory regime
borrowed from the system set up by World Health Organisation (WHO) to identify and manage
pandemics whose characteristics and architecture parallel those of the banking system is appropriate.
It should be noted the paper is concerned with the principles of an efficient regulatory system for
banks, and not with detailed methodology to implement the efficient system.
2. CASs
Complexity theory has been widely applied in both the natural science and the social science areas in
recent years to better understand likely system outcomes. Several recent papers have discussed
complexity implications of economic systems (Li et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2018), languages (Ellis
and Larsen-Freeman, 2010), cities (Batty, 2007; Bettencourt and West, 2010), ecosystems and the
World Wide Web (Albert et al., 1999; Park and Williger, 2005). Whilst there is no formal definition
of a CAS, numerous papers have discussed the common characteristics of a CAS. Mitchell (2006)
developed a simple definition of a CAS as being
a large network of relatively simple components with no central control, in which emergent
complex behaviour is exhibited.
This simple definition encompasses three important features of a CAS, namely, there are a large
number of components, there is no central control and there is emergent behaviour. Freedman
(2006) also added “observability”, which was described as the ability of components to influence the
system, as a necessary characteristic of a CAS. The behaviour of the components may be able to be
simply described when the number of components in the CAS is small, however, when the com-
ponents become numerous enough, conventional means will become impractical (Cilliers, 1998).
Vemuri argued:
The number of attributes necessary to describe or characterise a system are too many. Not all
these attributes are necessarily observable. Very often these problems defy definition as to
objective, philosophy, and scope. Stated differently, the structure or configuration of the
system is rarely self-evident. In large systems involving, say, people, plants, computers, and
communication links, there is scope for many possible configurations and selection of one out
of several possibilities has far-reaching repercussions (1978).
A review of global banking regulation
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One distinguishing feature of a CAS is that the components must have the ability to interact
meaningfully (Giddens, 1984), and allow the system to adapt as a result of such interactions. It is not
necessary for all the agents to be directly connected, but as Cilliers (1998), Levin (1998) and Miller
& Page (2007) argue, there are connections between the agents in aggregate within the network, and
localised interactions proceed through these connections. Complexity emerges from the interaction
and interconnectivity of agents within and between a system and the environment it exists in
(Mitleton-Kelly, 2003a). These connections could be relatively simple and stable, such as co-
authorship between researchers, or complex and changing, such as the trading behaviour in financial
stock markets. Interactions themselves in the CAS have several important characteristics. First, these
interactions are non-linear, i.e. the agents interact in non-additive ways (Holland, 2002). The non-
linearity brings two results, first, there is no direct proportionality between the input and output, and
second, the state of the system is not the sum of the action of individual agents (Andriani, 2003).
Consequently, small input changes can result in large effects on the stability of the system. Second,
the interactions usually have a fairly short range (Cilliers, 1998). The short range allows the influence
of events to spread quickly along interconnected paths in a system. Another feature that is important
for the interactions is recurrence. Marwan et al. wrote:
experience allows remembering similar situations, making predictions and, hence, helps to
survive. But remembering similar situations, e.g., the hot and humid air in summer which
might eventually lead to a thunderstorm, is only helpful if a system (such as the atmospheric
system) returns or recurs to former states. Such a recurrence is a fundamental characteristic of
many dynamical systems (2007).
Importantly, the loops in the interactions allow a feedback process to occur, both positively and
negatively (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003b). CAS can then reach a far-from-equilibrium condition and the
system becomes “inordinately sensitive to external influences. Small inputs yield huge, startling
effects” (Toffler, 1984). Another characteristic of CAS is that there is no central control, i.e., there is
no component in the CAS that can “order” other components to react in a particular manner. Arthur
et al. (1997) argued in a CAS such as the economy, there is no global control for interactions, but the
mechanisms of competition and coordination provide a control function among agents. Mitleton-
Kelly (2003a) suggested that in a bank the agent interactions are neither managed nor controlled
from the top, but communication provides the connectivity. Johnson (2004) argued that CAS rely on
feedback for growth and self-organisation. Feedback provides the system with a way of adapting to
the changing environment and the system can then adapt to an emerging environment and survive.
Emergence is also a distinguishing characteristic of CAS. Emergence is best defined as the process of
interdependent agents acting and creating a new order with self-organisation following simple rules
(Dooley, 1997). Emergence is a macro-level phenomenon as a result of the local-level interaction,
which results in the system as a whole having larger reactions than would be predicted from the sum
of its agents individual reactions. Kauffman (1993) recognised that the emergent property in a CAS
creates spontaneous order from self-organisation by the interaction of agents and emergence due to
adaption and evolution over time. Another feature of CAS is co-evolution which occurs where the
evolution of one agent is partly dependent on the evolution of other agents (Ehrlich & Raven, 1964;
Kauffman, 1993). Mitleton-Kelly (2003b) argued the notion of co-evolution in a CAS will change the
perspective and assumptions of traditional theories as under such co-evolution conditions, the
behaviour (i.e. decisions, strategies, action) is not a simple response to the changing environment, but
it will influence the environment as well as other agents that connect to it. This notion, therefore,
implies that the actions and decisions will affect the whole system and reflects the observability
characteristic suggested by Freedman (2006). In summary, a CAS is a system with a large number of
agents, where these agents have no central control and interact with others, and this interaction
John Evans and Yifei Li
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results in the emergence of the system. A CAS is then an integrated group of agents, that will react to
stimuli and reorganise to a position of stability which may well be a new state or a previous state.
This ability to reorganise to a new or old state of stability is known as phase transition and self-
organised criticality and is an important characteristic of CAS when considering appropriate
regulation.
3. System of Systems (SoS) and Federation of Systems (FoS)
SoS and FoS are closely related concepts and have been discussed more in relation to engineering and
defence systems than social and biological systems, but the concepts and consequences have parti-
cular relevance to the global banking system. Both SoS and FoS relate to very large systems that
consist of sub systems that exist in their own right. Just as there is no widely accepted definition of a
CAS, there is no widely accepted definition of a SoS and a FoS (Krygiel, 1999), but the features of a
SoS are given by Krygiel (1999) as:
∙ Each sub system is capable of independent action.
∙ The individual sub systems are managed individually.
∙ The SoS exhibits emergent behaviour.
∙ The SoS is evolutionary and sub systems change.
Freedman (2014) went further and added the concept of “belonging” to the characteristics of a SoS,
where “belonging” entails some level of rules that the sub systems must abide by. Freedman in an
earlier publication (Freedman, 2006) also asserted that SoS were CAS. Whilst a SoS may well reflect
most of the characteristics of a CAS, the characteristic of “belonging” would seem to be at odds with
the “no central control” characteristic usually attributed to CAS. We accept that the “belonging”
concept can vary considerably from a loose agreement amongst the sub-systems to an enforceable
agreement such as exists in military arrangements like NATO (Krygiel, 1999) and whilst a SoS may
not meet all the criteria to be a CAS, it could be considered as “CAS like”. A FoS is similar to a SoS
but without central control (Krygiel, 1999), and would then be a CAS. The current Basel regime is an
example of a FoS as the Basel requirements are not enforceable at the global level and consequently
allow country regulators to adopt the components of the Basel regime that suit their economic and
political situation.
4. Phase Transition and Self-Organised Criticality in CAS
A phase transition is the transformation of a system from one state to another (Ivancevic & Ivan-
cevic, 2008; Nishimori & Ortiz, 2011). CAS all display the phase transition phenomena (Solé, 2011).
Johansen & Sornette (1999) suggested that a capital market crash can be seen as a phase transition
with the traders in the stock market having only three possible actions, i.e. selling, buying or waiting,
and the traders interact with a limited number of other traders to estimate the response of the market
as a whole in terms of an increase or decrease in stock value.
5. Networks, Central System Control and Emergence in the Banking System
Networks in the financial system of which banks are a component have been discussed for some time
with Schweizer et al. (2009) and Billio et al. (2013) describing the high connectivity in the financial
system. Freedman (2014) described the financial system as a SoS to reflect the complexity of the
A review of global banking regulation
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overall financial system as being made up of interacting sub-systems that exist as systems in their
own right. The connectivity in the banking system is often referred to as a “small world network”
which is found frequently in the real world and is one in which most nodes in the network can reach
other nodes by a small number of steps. Boss et al. (2004) examined the network structure of the
Austrian interbank market using data from Oesterreichische Nationalbank from 2000 to 2003 and
concluded that the Austrian interbank network was a small world network with only a small number
of steps between each node. Similarly, Kanno (2015) assessed the network structure of the Japanese
interbank market and found it had the characteristics of a small world network and a scale-free
network. Baum et al. (2003) showed the Canadian investment bank syndicate network from 1952 to
1990 exhibited small world network properties. Another network model is the Barabási–Albert
model (Barabási & Albert, 1999; Albert et al., 1999) which grow through the joining of new nodes
that connect to the existing nodes in the system, and these new nodes have a higher probability to
connect to nodes with a large number of existing connections in the system. This type of network can
be seen in banking systems where new entrants tend to connect to the larger banks as illustrated by
the connections to Lehmans that unfolded in the GFC, and this characteristic is important when
considering regulation of the banking system. Battiston et al. (2012a) found that the 22 institutions
that received the most financial support from the US FED in the GFC were heavily connected with
99% having just one or two steps between each institution. In the banking system there is no global
control for the activities of participants with regulators concerned only with specific geographic areas.
It is relatively easy to observe the emergent property of a CAS in the banking system as it is impossible
to predict the market change by observing one or two institutions. The activities in the banking system
are influenced by other agents and the co-evolution with other agents (ul-Haq, 2005; Song & Thakor,
2010). It is reasonable then to conclude that the banking system presents the essential characteristics of
a CAS, i.e. numerous agents, interactions among agents but with very few steps between connected
agents, no central control and emergence and this conclusion is supported by Leonetti & Triulzi
(2016). The global banking system would also appear to be a FoS in that it is a large interconnected
system but where the regulatory system applies only to specific economies and not globally.
6. Spread and Impact of Bank Crises
The two characteristics of bank failures that are important are the ability of a crisis in a few banks to
spread to other banks and then the impact on the economy once the crisis has spread. The propensity for
banking crises to spread globally has been modelled by Garas et al. (2010) where they used a “sus-
ceptible–infected–recovered (SIR)-type model” to ascertain the ability of different sized banks to “infect”
other banks. The SIR model was derived to study impacts of pandemics, and is a relatively simple model
in concept that involves setting just a few variables within the following equations in a limited population
N with constant rate of infection k and the rate of removal l (Kermack & McKendrick, 1927):
dx
dt
=kxy
dy
dt
= kxyly
dz
dt
= ly
where x+y+ z=N.
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Garas found that as would be expected, economies like the United States with significant inter-
connections with other economies can spread bank crises quickly, but also there is a possibility of
even less connected economies spreading a global banking crisis. Given that banking crises have the
propensity to spread globally, then the impact of the crises becomes important. The cost of banking
failures can be evaluated by the impact on the real economy. The impact of systemic banking failures
has been modelled by Bougheas et al. (2018) who reached the conclusion that macroeconomic crises
were preceded by banking crises and in the absence of a stabilising mechanism, allowing for “fire
sale” of assets, at the limit the whole banking system ran out of credit facilities. We have quantified
the effect of banking crises on credit facilities using the gross domestic product (GDP) growth
deviation methodology developed by Laeven & Valencia (2010) for financial crises in the United
States, Ireland, Mexico, Thailand and Japan. We have analysed the domestic credit provided to the
private sector by banks for the three years before the beginning of the crises to the end of crises (or 3
years if shorter). The crisis periods are taken from the Global Financial Development database of the
World Bank1. The initial years of the United States, Ireland, Mexico, Thailand and Japan financial
crises that we have analysed are 2007, 2008, 1994, 1997 and 2007, respectively. We have chosen
domestic credit as the indicator of the impact of banking failures as the supply of credit by the
banking system enhances economic growth, and therefore when the banking industry is relatively
weak, the economy is also affected. Table 1 shows the domestic credit provided by the banking
sector from 3 years before the crises (Year T) to the end of crises and Figure 1 shows the change in
the supply of domestic credit.
Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate that the banking failures had an impact on the supply of domestic
credit and by implication, on economic growth. Schich & Kim (2010) indicated that the gross
fiscal costs as a result of a financial crisis amongst the OECD’s Committee on Financial Markets
participants have been between 20% and 40% of annual GDP. Comparison of the relative impact
of “normal” bank failures or “business as usual” losses against systemic failure impacts is dif-
ficult to undertake due to data availability, but as an estimate, in Table 2 and Figure 2 we have
shown for the same crises in Table 1 the domestic credit being supplied by the banks before and
after the crises. We would argue that the periods prior to the systemic crises include by default the
“business as usual” losses and the analysis provides an indication of relative costs to the economy
of “normal” costs and systemic failure costs to the economies. Such an analysis indicates the
systemic costs are significantly greater than the normal costs from “business as usual” losses in
the banks.
To minimise economic loss, efficient regulation of the banking system should then include
identification and management of systemic failures as these clearly have significant economic
impact.
Table 1. Domestic credit provided by financial sector as a share of gross domestic product (%) in the crises
periods.
T− 3 T − 2 T − 1 T T + 1 T+ 2 T +3 T + 4
United States 212.9 216.3 226.3 235.9 216.7 234.4 231.4 231.0
Ireland 152.7 172.5 234.0 230.6 233.6 236.1 227.4
Mexico 37.8 40.4 32.8 39.1 41.3 31.2
Thailand 128.5 140.2 145.4 178.4 173.9 150.8 134.2
Japan 273.6 277.3 280.8 266.8 285.4 296.7 294.9 285.1
A review of global banking regulation
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7. A Review of the Basel Regime
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988) published its first International Convergence
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (known as Basel I) which was aimed at governing
the capital adequacy of banks through four pillars of Risk Weights, A Target Standard Ratio and
Transitional and Implementing Agreements. In response to the evolution of the banking industry,
to enhance the financial stability of the banking system, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2006) proposed Basel II which addressed the shortfalls of Basel I through
strengthening capital adequacy requirements and introducing supervisory review and disclosure
of banking practices. Basel II was widely criticised after the GFC. Lall (2012) went so far as to
argue Basel II was an underlying cause of the GFC. Freedman (2014) commented that outsourcing
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4
Change rate of Domestic credit provided by financial sector
US Ireland Mexico Thailand Japan
Figure 1. Change rate of domestic credit provided by financial sector.
Table 2. Domestic credit to private sector by banks as a share of gross domestic product (%) in the crises
periods.
T − 3 T− 2 T − 1 T T +1 T + 2 T + 3 T +4
United States 53.0 55.0 56.9 59.3 59.7 53.0 51.7 49.8
Ireland 124.7 144.9 157.9 165.9 168.6 133.1 115.5
Mexico 20.9 28.0 25.3 30.9 24.3 15.7
Thailand 125.6 138.7 146.3 166.5 153.4 127.7 105.1
Japan 176.3 175.6 174.1 184.5 190.6 190.9 184.7 107.4
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
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Figure 2. Change of domestic credit to private sector by banks.
1 World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org
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of credit risk models by the banks also lead to “groupthink” and lack of real diversification as the
models were all calibrated the same and used the same data. Consequently, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2011) published Basel III aimed at improving the ability of banks to
withstand future financial crises, through enhancing the risk management as well as strengthening
transparency, governance and disclosure practices of the banks. Basel III limited the use of internal
models, and significantly increased the capital requirement for banks. McKinsey (2010) pointed
out the revised approach would result in higher capital for nearly all European banks, including
banks with good profit margins and low loss records, with an estimated capital increase of 60%. It
was also shown that Basel 111 failed to establish links between capital requirements and man-
agement (Mignola et al., 2016), and it was argued that as a result management might discard
internal models, which challenged the maintenance of sound risk management practices. Pillar 2
of Basel 111 is designed to ensure supervisory review. Pillar 2 requires all risks (other than the
three risks in Pillar 1) to be quantified and stress tested, with the assessment reported through an
internal capital adequacy assessment process document to the board of directors, the relevant
regulator and to the market. Pillar 3 of Basel 111 effectively relies on market participants to
monitor the banks (Balthazar, 2006). It was intended as a complement to the minimum capital
requirements and supervisory review process by developing a set of disclosure requirements that
would allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the capital, risk exposures,
risk assessment processes and hence the capital adequacy of the institution (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2006). The market assessment concept is supported by Baumann & Nier
(2004) who investigated the cross-sectional association between banks’ long turn average stock
price volatility and long-term average disclosure level and found banks that disclose more
information showed lower stock price volatility than banks that disclose less information, which
would appear to indicate that the market disclosure requirements could have some positive effect.
Whilst Basel 111 was a significant improvement on Basel 11, Basel 111 is still based upon reg-
ulation of individual banks in order to achieve financial stability, and this approach was criticised
by Morris & Shin (2008) who indicated the need to understand the systemic importance of assets
and the need for capital to stabilise liabilities in an interrelated financial system. Whilst Morris &
Shin (2008) considered the system issues of regulation, their analysis was not based on a reg-
ulatory system that is derived from the assumption that the banking system is a CAS. Similarly,
whilst Hanson et al. recognised
In the aftermath of the (GFC) crisis, there seems to be agreement among both academics and
policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction (2011).
Their analysis assumed that what they termed macroprudential regulation was “an effort to control
the social costs associated with excessive balance sheet shrinkage on the part of multiple financial
institutions hit with a common shock”, which again fails to recognise that in a CAS it is not
necessary for a phase transition to occur from a common shock, as it may occur from multiple
unrelated shocks. A further aspect of the Basel regime is that it is aimed at producing a level playing
field amongst banks to avoid arbitrage across regulators (Boyer & Kempf, 2017). This has been
criticised by Morrison & White (2009) who argued that a level global playing field actually rein-
forces a “race to the bottom” as country-specific regulators compete to attract banks, and this is
obviously a consequence of the Basel regime not being enforceable in any particular country. Most
tellingly, a consequence of banking systems being a CAS is that whilst individual banks may appear
stable, the system may be unstable (Battiston et al., 2012). Gualandri et al. (2008) argued that the
prudential regulation and supervision had been proved inadequate to cope with the GFC and
concluded a wider rethink of the design of regulation and supervision at the national and
A review of global banking regulation
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international level, was required in order to build adequate supervision and regulations to mitigate
crises such as GFC. What is important to appreciate, which has not been specifically acknowledged
previously, is that the Basel system of regulation is a FoS with the regulatory approaches suggested
being applied at the discretion of specific countries and there is no mandatory requirement for
implementation.
8. Implications of the Banking System being a CAS for Regulation
We would argue that whilst it may appear that there are two types of institutional default, namely,
default of an individual institution and a systemic default of several institutions, given that the
banking system is a CAS with highly interconnected institutions, these defaults are the same, i.e. all
defaults are, or have the capacity to be systemic defaults. What differs is the extent of the systemic
default and this is a function of the interconnectedness relating to the driver of the default as
recognised by Battiston et al. (2016). The effect of shocks on a banking system assumed to be a CAS
was simulated by Acemoglu et al. (2015) who found that the banking networks were both robust
and fragile as suggested by Haldane (2009) in that the interconnectedness actually enhances stability
to a point and then flips to instability. Given that all or most banking defaults then have the potential
to be systemic, and as shown, systemic failures have much greater economic costs than “business as
usual” losses, regulation should have as an aim the containment of systemic defaults, in exactly the
same way that risk management of pandemics is aimed at containing the spread of the particular
disease. There are a lot of parallels between pandemic management and systemic financial system
management, including the definition of a pandemic being
an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries
and usually affecting a large number of people (McCloskey et al., 2014).
In the same paper, the authors commented
action is still focused on detection and response, not prevention. Most of the activity in global
pandemic preparedness will be of benefit only after the infection has emerged; this is essential
to global security, as preventive efforts cannot be entirely effective. However, the biggest gains
might come from preventing infections from emerging or from jumping to human beings
rather than from managing them after they have done so.
The prevention, followed by containment of pandemics has significant parallels with financial
system crises. The essential components of regulation related to pandemic management are, first,
that there is a global legal agreement that binds members, and within that agreement, the following
is in place:
Some functional components of hazard-specific preparedness and response systems are com-
mon to all hazards and can therefore be consolidated into a comprehensive system of emer-
gency risk management for health (ERMH). The objectives of ERMH are to:
∙ Strengthen country and community capacities to manage the health risks from all types of
hazards.
∙ Ensure that the essential components required in a comprehensive emergency risk management
programme are in place in the health sector.
∙ Link and integrate these components into (1) health systems, (2) multisectoral disaster
management systems and (3) other mechanisms across the whole of society, including relevant
risk management within non-health sectors.
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∙ Enable the health sector to advocate for and strengthen the health aspects of national and
international policies and frameworks related to emergency and disaster risk management,
particularly in the reduction of risk and health impact from all hazards (WHO, 2017).
The ERMH objectives are then linked to prevention at the country level followed by responses at the
international level. It is suggested this approach should be included in the regulation of financial
systems. Specifically, it is suggested that there should be:
∙ prevention at the country level;
∙ containment of systemic failures;
∙ a global legal agreement to cooperate once the systemic issue is likely to spread outside a
specific area.
This high-level regulatory regime recognises that the banking system operates as a CAS with a
concentrated network and will exhibit phase transitions from time to time, and whilst a CAS will
stabilise itself, the regulation is intended to make this occur as quickly as possible and with least
damage to the global economy as possible. The major differences between this suggested regime and
the current Basel regime are that it involves a globally enforceable agreement for countries to act to
prevent financial crises spreading outside specific countries. This suggestion would then transform
the global banking system from a FoS to a SoS. Prevention of global systemic risk at the country level
would be quite different to the current Basel regime which effectively concentrates on risks to each
institution and assumes no interconnection. The proposed regulation would specifically concentrate
on identifying the interconnectivity of the institutions both locally and globally and creating a
database of these to assist with containment if a crisis occurs or looks like it might occur and
parallels that in place by the WHO for management of pandemics. It is also suggested that con-
tainment must involve the broader community as it was quite clear from the GFC that the effects of
the potential bank failures spread to businesses as well. This prevention and containment process in
each country will require a rethink of the regulatory structure in place as most financial regulatory
structures have no responsibility for monitoring the wider effects of banking systemic failures outside
the financial sector. A further aspect of this suggested regulatory regime is that, like the management
of pandemics, as suggested by Battiston et al. (2016), it must operate in real time as the inter-
dependencies both within the banking system and across the wider community are dynamic and
changing over time. The work of Acemoglu et al. (2015) clearly illustrated that historical assump-
tions as to stability/instability of financial systems need to be challenged and they found that contrary
to opinion, “that as long as the magnitude (or the number) of negative shocks is below a critical
threshold, a more diversified pattern of interbank liabilities leads to less fragility. In particular, all
else equal, the sparsely connected ring financial network (corresponding to a credit chain) is the most
fragile of all configurations, whereas the highly interconnected complete financial network is the
configuration least prone to contagion… however, when negative shocks are larger than a certain
threshold, completeness is no longer a guarantee for stability”. Governments could well look to the
structure established to manage pandemics to manage systemic risks in the financial system.
9. Conclusion
We have shown that the banking system is a CAS and that losses in terms of reduced GDP arising
from systemic failures are more significant than “business as usual” losses. As a result, we would
suggest that a regulatory regime similar to that developed by the WHO for the management of
pandemics should be considered, and the current FoS should move towards a SoS, at least so far as
containment of global crises is concerned. The benefit of a regulatory system that specifically has a
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global legal structure and concentrates on systemic exposure by banks in a similar manner to the
WHO pandemic management system should have benefits in reducing the economic costs of banking
crises. We are not suggesting that a regulatory system similar to the Basel process should not be
adopted at the country level for internal management of banks, but that such a system should be
supplemented at the global level by a SoS approach reflecting the WHO approach to pandemic
detection and management.
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